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USE OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVES-
TIGATION INFORMATION IN
ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES
By JOHN W. SIMPSON *
University of Rochester, B.A., 1943; Harvard Law School, LL.B.,
1948; Fighter Pilot with 8th Air Force in England, World War II;
Attorney, Bureau of Law, Civil Aeronautics Board.
INTRODUCTION
T HE Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter referred to as the
Board ") investigates aircraft accidents to determine their probable
cause in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents in the fu-
ture. The question then arises as to whether the information gathered
in such investigations may be used in subsequent actions for damages
growing out of the accident. Section 701 (e) of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, as amended 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") , pro-
vides as follows:
"The records and reports of the Board shall be preserved in the
custody of the secretary of the Authority in the same manner and
subject to the same provisions respecting publication as the records
and reports of the Authority, except that any publication thereof
shall be styled 'Air Safety Board of the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity,' and that no part of any report or reports of the Board or the
Authority relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof,
shall be admitted as evidence or used. in any suit or action for dam-
ages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or re-
ports." 2
It has been contended by various persons that this section extends a
privilege not only to the accident reports of the Board itself, but also
prohibits the testimony of Board employees in civil suits for damages
and precludes the use in such suits of reports by Board employees to the
Board, the transcript of the testimony and the documents used in Board
accident inquiries, and copies of records and reports which have been
introduced into Board accident inquiries by air carriers, aircraft manu-
facturers, and other persons. The exact scope and purpose of Sec. 701
(e) are at the present time the subject of great uncertainty for there is
* The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author only
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
152 Stat. 1013 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §581 (1946).
2 The Civil Aeronautics Board now has all the powers and duties granted by
Title VII of the Act to the Civil Aeronautics Authority and to the Air Safety
Board. Therefore, Sec. 701 (e) applies to reports of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Reorganization Plan No. IV, 3 Code Fed. Regs. p. 332 (Supp. 1940), effective June
30, 1940.
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almost no valuable legislative history to aid in its interpretation 3 and,
prior to the recent decision on a motion in Tansey v. TWA, 4 there was
no complete, written court decision on the question. The purpose of
this article is to bring together all of the scattered aids to interpretation
and to answer, insofar as it is possible at the present time, the legal ques-
tions involved in Sec. 701 (e) . It should be noted that this article deals
only with the scope of the privilege granted by this section and does not
consider whether accident information would otherwise be admissible
under the rules of evidence.
RECORDS AND TESTIMONY IN BOARD INQUIRIES
The most difficult question is whether the language of Sec. 701 (e)
extends a privilege to testimony taken at a Board accident inquiry and
to the numerous documents and records used in a Board investigation,
so that such evidence cannot be used in a subsequent suit or action for
damages growing out of any matter mentioned in a Board report. 5
The first line of Sec. 701 (e) makes a clear distinction between the "rec-
ords" and the "reports" of the Board and the second half of the section
provides that only the "report or reports" of the Board shall be inadmis-
sible in evidence. This distinction was pointed out as a basis for a rul-
ing that Sec. 701 (e) applied to the Board report only and did not
preclude the use of testimony from a Board inquiry to impeach a wit-
ness during the taking of a deposition for use in an action for damages.
Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines.6
Two other court decisions are in accord with this ruling. In ruling
on objections to interrogatories in the case of Kendall and Sebo v.
3 The only legislative history on this section is a statement by Mr. Henry Al-
len Johnston of the Committee on Aeronautics, Association of the Bar, New York,
N. Y., to the effect that accident investigation records could not be used for any
purpose in any litigation (Senate hearings on S. 3659, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., April
6, 1938, p. 18). Since there is no evidence that Congress, or even the Subcommit-
tee, did or did not agree with his statement, it would seem to have little or no
probative value in determining the intent of Congress. Furthermore, S. 3659 did
not become law and S. 3845, which eventually became the Civil Aeronautics Act,
contained additional language making a clear distinction between the "records"
and the "reports" of the Board. See, however, RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ACT ANNOTATED (1939), p. 157.
4 U.S. Dt. Ct. for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 5151-47, Feb. 3,
1950.
5 Sec. 701(e) by its own terms does not apply to a proceeding before the
Board for the revocation of a safety certificate or to any criminal prosecution.
See, however, Sec. 1004(i) of the Act (54 Stat. 1022 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §644
(1946). It was probably not designed to apply to an action by the Administrator
for a civil penalty, even though civil penalties are based on the theory that the
government is being reimbursed for damages to it.
6 Unreported opinion in a letter of Sept. 26, 1947 from Judge Leibell to the
counsel in the case. (S. D. N. Y., Civil Action No. 40-730.) During the taking of
a deposition on October 6, 1947, Judge Leibell qualified his opinion by stating that
a judge ruling upon questions put to a witness upon the taking of a deposition
takes a broad, liberal view, and if there is any likelihood that the testimony would
be admissible at the trial, he overrules the objection to that question, leaving to
the trial judge the final determination of the question of admissibility.
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United Air Lines,7 the judge held that testimony taken in a Board in-
quiry could be used to check the veracity of a witness in answering the
interrogatories. In Tansey v. TWA, the defendant interjected Sec. 701
(e) as the basis for refusing to produce for the plaintiff's inspection cer-
tain documents (including both routine records and a special report
prepared by TWA employees as to the cause of the accident) because
they had been submitted to the Board for use in an accident investiga-
tion. The court rejected this argument and held that the records had
to be produced for inspection.
The theory used to support the contention that Sec. 701 (e) prevents
the use of all testimony and documents considered by the Board,
whether in the hands of the Board or of a private person, is that this
section was enacted for the purpose of encouraging full and frank dis-
closure by witnesses who might otherwise withhold evidence if they
knew that it could be used against them in suits for damages. Several
court decisions have held that this was the purpose of a similar statute
as to railroad accident reports." In the Gourley case, the court used this
theory as the basis for a refusal to admit testimony previously taken at
an Interstate Commerce Commission invetigation.9 In Tansey v.
TWA, the judge stated that the reasoning of these cases was not without
persuasion but added that "nothing has been found by way of legisla-
tive history, or by way of language of either the Act of Congress relating
to the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Act of
Congress here under consideration, to compel this view as to the pur-
pose of the statutes."
But even assuming that the railroad reports statute was designed to
encourage full and frank disclosure, it is quite possible that Sec. 701 (e)
7 Unreported memorandum opinion. (S. D. N. Y., Civil Actions No. 47-501
and No. 48-185, Oct. 21, 1949.) The entire portion dealing with this question is as
follows, "The objections to interrogatories based on 49 U.S.C.A. Section 581 can-
not be sustained because it does not appear that the content of any report of the
Civil Aeronautics Board relating to any accident or the investigation thereof is
sought by those interrogatories. It does not even appear that the Board has made
any report whatsoever."
8 Louisville and N. R. R. v. Grant, 234 Ky. 276, 27 S. W. (2d) 980, 984(1930); Gourley v. Chicago and E. I. Ry., 295 Ill. App. 160, 14 N. E. (2d) 842
(1938).
Sec. 701 (e) is apparently based on similar sections in two earlier statutes: 36
Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. §41 (1946) (railroad accident reports) and 36 Stat.
916 (1911) as amended, 45 U.S.C. §33 (1946) (railroad boiler accident reports).
See also 54 Stat. 927 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §320 (1946) (motor carrier accident re-
ports). The legislative history of the railroad reports statute supports the theory
that it was designed to encourage full and frank disclosure. See the statements of
Rep. Mann in introducing H.R. 3649 in the House of Representatives. Cong. Rec.
61st Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1909). See also H.R. Rep. No. 36, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1909) and Sen. Rep. No. 240, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) which state that the
I.C.C. was given authority to investigate accidents because the reports of the car-
riers as to the causes of accidents had been vague and unsatisfactory.
9 The legislative history of the railroad reports statute is conflicting as to
whether it precludes the use in a civil suit of testimony given before the Commis-
sion. Rep. Mann thought that it could not be used. Cong. Rec., 61st Cong., 2d
Sess. 159 (1909). Rep. Olmsted, another staunch supporter of the bill, stated that
such testimony would not be excluded unless it was made a part of the I.C.C. re-
port. P. 156. See also the amendments made by the Senate, Cong. Rec., 61st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3459, 5302, 5449, 5514 (1910).
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was not enacted for the same purpose. The railroad reports statute re-
quires the railroads to file monthly accident reports with the I.C.C.10
and provides that such reports, as well as the I.C.C. reports, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Even though the Civil Aeronautics Act
authorizes the Board to require the filing of accident reports," it does
not specifically provide that such reports shall be inadmissible in ac-
tions for damages. If Congress had intended to encourage the disclo-
sure of information by making such reports privileged, it would have
been a simple matter to refer to them specifically as it did in the rail-
road reports statute and the motor carriers reports statute.12
There are several reasons why Congress might have wanted to pre-
clude the use of Board reports in actions for damages which would not
also require that the privilege be extended to the evidence on which
such reports were based. If the findings of the Board as to the probable
cause of an accident were admitted in evidence they would probably be
conclusive in the minds of most jurors, for the average juror would rec-
ognize that the Board is an impartial body which has a great deal of
technical knowledge and experience as to aircraft accidents. This
would be prejudicial to parties who had not taken part in the Board
accident inquiry.'3 It would also be prejudicial to the rights of the liti-
gants since Board accident inquiries follow administrative fact finding
procedures which are not designed to provide the safeguards guaran-
teed by judicial procedures and the formal rules of evidence. 14 There-
fore, Congress may have made Board reports inadmissible in evidence
so that the Board would not usurp the function of judge and jury to de-
cide civil liabilities. 15
10 36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. §38 (1946).
"ISec. 702(a) (1), 52 Stat. 1013 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §582 (1946). See Civil
Air Regulations, Part 62, 14 Fed. Reg. 4319 (1949).
12 Congress was quite explicit in providing a privilege in the case of self-
incriminating testimony. Sec. 1004(i), 52 Stat. 1022 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §644
(1946). See also Sec. 1104, 52 Stat. 1026 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §674 (1946).
In the Tansey case it was argued that Sec. 701(e) did contain explicit lan-
guage making such evidence privileged because it should be read as "no part of
any report of the Board relating to any accident, or no part of the investigation
thereof," etc., rather than as "no part of any report of the Board relating to any
accident, or any report of the Board relating to the investigation thereof." Thejudge rejected this argument stating, "It is true mention is made in the statute of
investigations by the Board, but the language readily may be construed to make
privileged only reports of the investigations, not information received in the
course of the investigation."
13 Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., supra note 6; Tensey v. TWA,
supra note 4.
14 Accident inquiries are at all times controlled and conducted by the Board of
Inquiry and private attorneys are not allowed to present or cross-examine wit-
nesses (however, the Board of Inquiry will ask any pertinent questions submitted
in writing by private persons). The Board does not follow the formal rules of
evidence, but frequently admits hearsay and opinion evidence for what they are
worth. Such procedures are perfectly fair if the sole purpose of the Board report
is to make recommendations for the prevention of similar accidents in the future,
but it might be considered unfair to allow a report, based on evidence collected by
such procedures, to influence the determination of the civil liabilities of private
parties.
15 During the debates on the railroad reports statute, Rep. Olmsted objected
to the use of I.C.C. accident reports in civil suits because "that would substitute
the finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission-its declaration of responsi-
bility-for the finding of a court and jury in a damage case." Cong. Rec., 61st
Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1909).
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Congress may well have thought that it would be in the interests of
aviation safety to have the Board make findings, for the purpose of pre-
venting accidents in the future, based on a lesser amount of evidence
than would be necessary to support findings for the purpose of assessing
liability for the damages resulting from the accident. 18 Therefore,
Congress may have enacted Sec. 701 (e) to give the Board complete free-
dom to determine the probable cause of an accident without having to
consider the huge civil liabilities which might flow from its findings if
they were admissible in suits for damages.
If Sec. 701 (e) was enacted so that the Board would not usurp the
function of the court and jury, or to guarantee that the Board should be
free to determine the probable cause of an accident without considering
civil liabilities, the function of the section could be carried out by
merely forbidding the use of the Board report in civil suits and it would
not be necessary to forbid the use of the evidence on which the Board
report was based. However, this raises the puzzling question of why it
was deemed necessary to make Board reports inadmissible in evidence
when they would seldom, if ever, be admissible anyway under the tech-
nical rules of evidence. It can be argued with considerable merit that
Sec. 701 (e) is useless if it does not apply to the evidence on which a
Board report is based, for the report of the Board itself would be inad-
missible anyway.
It is possible that Congress was acting upon the assumption that
accident reports would be admissible under the normal rules of evi-
dence.' 7 It is also possible that the reports were specifically made inad-
missible to make it unmistakably clear that the first part of Sec. 701 (e),
which makes accident reports subject to the same provisions for publi-
cation as other Board records, was not intended to make accident re-
ports admissible in evidence nor to provide that the findings of fact in
such reports should be conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence.'
TESTIMONY OF BOARD EMPLOYEES
There seems to be little doubt that the Civil Aeronautics Board can
issue regulations forbidding its employees from disclosing aircraft acci-
16 It is probably more than mere verbiage that Sec. 702 (a) (2) of the Act (52
Stat. 1013 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §582 (1946)) does not direct the Board to find the
"cause" of accidents, but merely directs it to find the "probable cause" of acci-
dents. This language seems to instruct the Board to make what amounts to a
"highly informed guess" as to the cause of an accident, so as to take all possible
precautions to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents in the future.
17 There was a rather confusing discussion of this question during the House
debates on the railroad reports statute. Cong. Rec., 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
Rep. Graham (p. 157) and Rep. Martin (p. 159) both stated that an I.C.C. acci-
dent report would never be admissible under the technical rules of evidence. Rep.
Mann insisted that such reports would be admissible unless rendered inadmissible
by statute (pp. 157-158).
18 See Sec. 205(d), 52 Stat. 984 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §425, and Sec. 1006(e), 52
Stat. 1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §646 (1946).
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dent information either by producing Board records in court 19 or by
testifying in court as to such information.2" The Board has adopted
the rule that employees who are permitted to appear as witnesses in
court actions may testify only as to facts actually observed by them in
the course of accident investigations and may not give opinion evidence
as expert witnesses.21
This rule conforms to the provisions of Sec. 701 (e) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act. Court decisions interpreting similar provisions as to
railroad reports have held that they do not prevent an investigator from
testifying as to facts actually observed by him in the course of an acci-
dent investigation. 22 There are no judicial decisions on the subject,
but a good argument may be made that Sec. 701 (e) precludes opinion
testimony by Board investigators. Since the Board members must nec-
essarily rely heavily on its staff's reports in the preparation of accident
reports, the reports of Board employees may be considered to be parts
of and to collectively form the report of the Board and thus cannot be
introduced in evidence because of Sec. 701 (e) . Opinion testimony
by Board investigators would in effect reveal the contents of their re-
ports, and it has been held that a provision which prohibits the intro-
duction in evidence of certain documents also prohibits testimony in
court as to the contents of such documents. 24
The same reasons which led Congress to prohibit the use of Board
reports in actions for damages would lead it to preclude opinion testi-
mony by Board employees. Opinion testimony by a Board employee
would be almost as conclusive in the minds of the jury, and therefore
almost as likely to usurp the function of the court and jury, as the intro-
duction in evidence of a Board report. Board employees would not be
free to determine the probable cause of an accident without considering
civil liabilities if they knew that they would later have to testify as to
their conclusions in actions for damages. Therefore, it may be argued
that the statutory policy set forth in Sec. 701 (e) which precludes the
use of a Board report in an action for damages also precludes opinion
19 Boske v. Commingore, 177 U.S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701 (1900); Ex parte
Sackett, 74 F. (2d) 922 (9th Cir., 1935).
20 In re Huttman, 70 Fed. 699 (Kans. 1893) ; In re Lamberton, 124 Fed. 446
(Ark. 1903); In re Weeks, 82 Fed. 729 (Vt. 1897); First National Bank v. Wil-
liams, 142 Ore. 648, 20 P. (2d) 222 (1933); Harewood v. McCurty, 22 F. Supp.
572 SKy. 1938).
1 The Board has also ruled that its employees may not serve as witnesses for
the purpose of testifying to facts observed by them in the course of accident inves-
tigations except in those cases in which the Government's investigators are the
only source of information available to the party seeking the evidence. This ap-
pears to be a reasonable provision since Board investigators are hired for the pur-
pose of investigating accidents and not to testify in private actions. It also appears
to be reasonable because the Board makes available to the public all the informa-
tion in its accident investigation files, except for the opinions of its investigators.
22 Gerow v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,,188 N. C. 76, 123 S. E. 473 (1924); cf.
Hines v. Kelley, 252 S. W. 1033 (Tex. Com. App. 1923).
23 Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115, 63 Sup. Ct. 477 (1942) where the
Supreme Court used language which can be interpreted as indicating that a stat-
ute prohibiting the use in court of accident reports from a railroad to the I.C.C.
also prohibited the use of reports to the railroad from its employees.
24 In re Huttman, supra note 20; In re Lamberton, supra note 20.
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testimony by Board employees in such actions. However, since there
are no judicial decisions it is impossible to make any definite statement
as to the applicability of Sec. 701 (e) to the testimony of Board em-
ployees. It may never be necessary for a court to decide this question
because, as stated before, the Board clearly has the power to regulate
testimony by its employees.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
No analysis of Sec. 701 (e) would be complete without a discussion
of the policy considerations, both because it might be considered neces-
sary to enact legislation changing the provisions of the section, 25 and
because a court might be influenced by strong policy considerations.
The basic consideration is that justice requires all accident information
to be available to both the plaintiff and the defendant in a civil suit, un-
less there is some compelling reason for withholding such information.
It is often argued that it is far more important to discover the cause of
an accident in order to prevent future accidents than to compensate the
victims of past accidents, and that in order to encourage all witnesses to
make a full and frank disclosure it is necessary to provide that such
information cannot be used in suits for damages. There is considerable
merit to this argument, but it must be tempered with other considera-
tions.
In order to guarantee complete disclosure it would probably be nec-
essary to adopt a policy of absolute privilege and complete secrecy as to
accident information, for it would often be a comparatively simple mat-
ter for a person who had access to the Board's information to subpoena
the same records from the defendant or to ask witnesses the same ques-
tions in a subsequent suit. Such a degree of secrecy would come close
to rendering defendants immune from suit. This would not only be
grossly unfair to the victims of aircraft accidents, but would remove one
of the strongest incentives to prevent future accidents, i.e., the fear of
civil liability as the result of an accident.
Another reason for not overemphasizing the full and frank disclo-
sure argument is that much information will be received even though
no privilege is granted. It is unwarranted to assume that all witnesses
will withhold or falsify information even though its disclosure might
prevent accidents and save lives. In addition to the moral compulsion
to give truthful testimony, persons and companies will often reveal dan-
gerous conditions because of their economic stake in preventing
accidents which destroy public confidence in aviation. Moreover, rep-
resentatives of industry and employee groups often participate in Board
investigations and are quite anxious to reveal information which will
fix the responsibility on some other person or group. And finally, the
Board has wide powers to subpoena witnesses and documents if infor-
25 See, for example, Sec. 705 of H.R. 5561, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., a bill to recre-
ate an independent Air Safety Board. This bill would extend a privilege to all
records and testimony used in an accident investigation.
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mation is being withheld.26 These considerations indicate that the situ-
ations in which vital information could and would be withheld are not
likely to be as numerous as some people have contended. However,
there will still be some situations where a person would disclose more
information if he knew that it could not be used against him.
The basic problem is to develop a policy which will achieve a proper
balance between securing information and compensating the victims of
accidents. The formula for reaching this solution should be based
upon two concepts: (1) Aircraft accidents are investigated solely for the
purpose of preventing similar accidents in the future and not to help
private persons recover damages. (2) Nevertheless, a plaintiff faces al-
most insuperable obstacles in getting evidence as to an airplane crash,
and accident investigation information should not be handled so as to
add to these difficulties.
The following recommendations are made on the basis of the above
considerations:
(1) The Board should make available to the public all factual infor-
mation gathered by it in an investigation because its procedures often
deprive certain persons of sources of information. The Board often pre-
vents witnesses from gaining information by roping off the scene of an
accident and by shipping certain aircraft parts to a laboratory for tests.
Furthermore, representatives of industry and employee groups are often
permitted to participate in the investigation and thus have access to
much information, while the representatives of the victims seldom par-
ticipate in the investigation. These procedures are absolutely necessary
in order to determine the probable cause of an accident, but they would
be unfair if the Board did not make available to the public the informa-
tion gathered in the investigation.
(2) All records and reports submitted to the Board by private per-
sons should be available for use in actions for damages. If a privilege
were extended to such documents, it would be virtually impossible for a
plaintiff to get access to any documentary evidence concerning an acci-
dent. Such documents should be available even from the Board's files,
for a rule to the contrary would enable persons to suppress evidence by
submitting every document to the Board, where it could not be reached
by an opposing party.
(3) Witnesses should be encouraged to disclose information in
Board inquiries by providing that their testimony cannot be used in ac-
tions for damages.27 This rule would not impose any additional burden
on plaintiffs in civil actions because the testimony obviously would not
have been available if it had not been for the Board inquiry. If a wit-
ness is completely honest he will tell the truth at both the Board inquiry
and the action for damages. If he is not completely honest, there is
nothing to be gained by encouraging him to withhold evidence or commit
perjury in the Board inquiry as well as in the civil action. However, it
26 Secs. 702(c), 902(g) and 1004 of the Act; 52 Stat. 1014, 1016, 1021 (1938);
49 U.S.C. §§582, 622, 644 (1946).
27 This rule should apply only to the use of such testimony in actions for dam-
ages. The testimony should be admissible in actions to revoke or suspend a safety
certificate because of the great public interest in preventing incompetent or reck-
less persons from endangering lives and property.
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should be noted that even extending a privilege to such testimony may
not guarantee a full and frank disclosure, for a witness will probably
realize that he may be asked, the same questions in an action for dam-
ages and that he will be subject to a perjury charge if he does not an-
swer them truthfully.
These recommendations would probably require legislative action,
since there appears to be no way that Sec. 701 (e) could be interpreted
to extend a privilege to testimony but not to documents.
CONCLUSIONS
The few judicial decisions existing to date indicate that Sec. 701 (e)
does not exclude from actions for damages the documents and testi-
mony on which the Board's reports are based. This conclusion is am-
ply supported by the language and the probable purposes of Sec.
701 (e).
It might be advisable to amend the section so as to prevent the use
of testimony from a Board inquiry in suits for damages. However, the
Board should continue to make available to the public all factual infor-
mation gathered in an accident investigation. All documents used in
Board inquiries should be admissible in actions for damages, whether
such documents are in the files of the Board or in the hands of private
persons.
The Board has the power to issue regulations governing the testi-
mony of its employees in civil actions. The Board has determined that
its employees may testify as to facts actually observed by them when
such facts cannot be readily obtained elsewhere, but may not give opin-
ion testimony as expert witnesses. A reasonable argument may be
made that Sec. 701 (e) precludes opinion testimony by Board em-
ployees, but there is no court opinion on the question.
